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INTRODUCTION 
n February 7, 2011, an anonymous Massachusetts resident 
tweeted1 Detroit Mayor David Bing: “Philadelphia has a statue 
of Rocky & Robocop would kick Rocky’s butt. He’s a GREAT 
ambassador for Detroit.”2 Mayor Bing responded that “[t]here are not 
any plans to erect a statue to Robocop. Thank you for the 
suggestion.”3 
While Mayor Bing did not think Detroit needed a statue of its 
fictional cybernetic guardian, the Internet disagreed. On February 9, 
2011, the Detroit nonprofit The Imagination Station4 created the 
 
1 A “tweet” is a 140-character-maximum message posted on the Twitter website. See 
The Story of a Tweet, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/what-is-twitter/story-of-a-tweet 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2014). 
2 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com 
/projects/imaginationstation/detroit-needs-a-statue-of-robocop?ref=category (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2014). RoboCop is a 1987 science-fiction/action film about a Detroit police officer 
who is murdered by a street gang and reincarnated as RoboCop, a crime-fighting cyborg. 
See ROBOCOP (Orion Pictures Corporation 1987); RoboCop, IMDB, http://www.imdb 
.com/title/tt0093870/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2014). 
3 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, supra note 2. 
4 The Imagination Station of Roosevelt Park is a Michigan nonprofit corporation. 
Corporate Entity Details, Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, 
MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/bcs_corp/dt_corp.asp?id_nbr=70712P&name 
_entity=THE%20IMAGINATION%20STATION%20OF%20ROOSEVELT%20PARK 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2014). It is either not eligible for or has not applied for federal tax-
exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012). See Exempt Organizations Select Check, 
O
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Kickstarter project “Detroit Needs A Statue of Robocop!”5 The goal 
of the project was to raise $50,000 to construct a RoboCop statue in 
Detroit.6 Less than two months later, 2718 people had pledged to 
contribute a total of $67,436 to the project in exchange for various 
rewards.7 Three years later, the statue is almost complete.8 
The RoboCop statue was an early crowdfunding success. 
“Crowdfunding” is a way of using the Internet to raise money by 
asking the public to contribute to a project.9 In the past, asking a large 
number of people to contribute small amounts of money to a project 
was expensive and inefficient for most organizations and individuals. 
By greatly reducing transaction costs,10 crowdfunding enables anyone 
to inexpensively and efficiently seek small contributions to a project. 
While crowdfunding is a new model of fundraising, it has already 
transformed funding for the arts. For example, the crowdfunding 
platform Kickstarter distributed more than forty million dollars to the 
creators of almost seventy-five hundred projects within two years of 
Kickstarter’s launch.11 On March 3, 2014, Kickstarter announced that 
it had received more than one billion dollars in pledges from 5.7 
million backers.12 By comparison, the 2014 budget for the National 
 
IRS, http://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/pub78Search.do?searchChoice=ePostcard&dispatch 
Method =selectSearch (Select: “Were automatically revoked”; Search: “27-3164734” “The 
Imagination Station of Roosevelt,” “Detroit,” “MI”) (last visited Aug. 2, 2014). 
5 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, supra note 2. Kickstarter is an online fundraising 
tool that focuses on funding creative projects. See generally Seven Things to Know About 
Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/hello?ref=footer (last visited May 
28, 2014). 
6 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, supra note 2. 
7 Id. Rewards included opportunities to visit the statue “in style” and meet-and-greet 
events with “other cool Detroit peoples.” Id. 
8 See Julie Hinds, RoboCop Statue in Hands of a Master from Venus Bronze Works in 
Detroit, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 17, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.freep.com/article 
/20140217/ENT01/302170017/RoboCop-statue-Giorgio-Gikas-Detroit; Lee DeVito, Take 
a Look at Detroit’s RoboCop Statue, METROTIMES (Feb. 5, 2014), http://metrotimes.com 
/news/take-a-look-at-detroit-s-robocop-statue-1.1629190. 
9 Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy, FORBES 
(Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is   
-crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/. 
10 A “transaction cost” is “a cost incurred in making an economic exchange.” 
Transaction Cost, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_cost (last visited 
June 3, 2014). Transaction costs include search and information costs. Id. 
11 See Yancey Strickler, Happy Birthday Kickstarter!, in Kickstarter Blog, 
KICKSTARTER (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.kickstarter.com/blog/happy-birthday-kick 
starter. 
12 OMG, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/1billion (last visited Aug. 2, 
2014). For current data on Kickstarter, see Stats, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter 
.com/help/stats (last updated Aug. 2, 2014, 2:17 PM). 
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Endowment for the Arts was $146 million.13 Kickstarter is only one 
of many crowdfunding platforms, which have collectively distributed 
billions of dollars to creative and charitable projects.14 
This Article argues that crowdfunding has succeeded, at least in 
part, because it makes charitable giving more efficient by solving 
certain “charity failures,” or inefficiencies created by the inability of 
the charitable contribution deduction to subsidize the charitable 
giving from low-income donors. The economic subsidy theory of the 
charitable contribution deduction explains that the deduction is 
justified because it solves market failures and government failures in 
charitable goods. According to this theory, free riding causes market 
failures in charitable goods, and majoritarianism15 causes government 
failures in charitable goods. The charitable contribution deduction 
solves these market and government failures by indirectly subsidizing 
charitable contributions, thereby compensating for free riding and 
avoiding majoritarianism.16 
The economic subsidy theory consists of an empirical hypothesis 
and a normative claim. The empirical hypothesis is that the charitable 
contribution deduction solves market failures and government 
failures; the normative claim is that this increased efficiency justifies 
the deduction.17 This Article takes no position on the normative 
claim, but argues that the remarkable success of crowdfunding helps 
confirm the empirical hypothesis of the economic subsidy theory. 
The empirical hypothesis of the economic subsidy theory implies 
that the charitable contribution deduction is itself inefficient because 
it cannot solve market and government failures in contributions by 
low-income donors. The subsidy provided by the deduction depends 
on a donor’s marginal tax rate, so the deduction provides a large 
subsidy to most high-income donors, and little or no subsidy to most 
 
13 See Appropriations History, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, http://arts.gov/open 
-government/national-endowment-arts-appropriations-history (last visited Aug. 2, 2014). 
14 See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5. 
15 “Majoritarianism” is “a traditional political philosophy or agenda which asserts that a 
majority . . . of the population is entitled to a certain degree of primacy in society, and has 
the right to make decisions that affect the society.” Majoritarianism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en 
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majoritarianism (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
16 See JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 109, 
113 (1995). 
17 See Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 
1047, 1058–59, 1077 (2009). 
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low-income donors.18 And if the deduction cannot subsidize 
contributions from low-income donors, the deduction cannot solve 
market and government failures in those contributions. I will refer to 
this inefficiency as a “charity failure.” 
This Article argues that crowdfunding is successful because it 
provides a technological solution to some of those charity failures. 
While the charitable contribution deduction causes charity failures 
because the deduction cannot subsidize contributions from low-
income donors, crowdfunding can subsidize those contributions by 
offering rewards instead. As a result, crowdfunding should solve at 
least some of the charity failures caused by the deduction through 
providing an incentive for low-income donors to contribute. The 
remarkable success of crowdfunding suggests that the inefficiency 
associated with charity failures is quite large. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the economic 
subsidy theory of the charitable contribution deduction. Part II shows 
why the premises of the economic subsidy theory imply that the 
deduction causes charity failures. Part III argues that crowdfunding 
can solve at least some of those charity failures. And Part IV suggests 
that the success of crowdfunding may reflect persistent inefficiency in 
the market for charitable goods. 
I 
THE ECONOMIC SUBSIDY THEORY OF THE CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION 
The charitable contribution deduction allows certain taxpayers to 
deduct specific charitable contributions from their income tax base 
under limited circumstances.19 The economic subsidy theory of the 
charitable contribution deduction argues that the deduction is justified 
because it solves market failures and government failures in 
charitable goods.20 Classical economics21 predicts that free riding will 
cause market failures in public goods and majoritarianism will cause 
 
18 See infra notes 67–83 and accompanying text. 
19 See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a) (2012). 
20 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113. For the purpose of this Article, 
“charitable goods” are goods produced by a charity in furtherance of its charitable mission. 
21 “Classical economics” refers to the economic theories written between 1776 through 
the early 1930s. KEYNES AND THE CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS: THE EARLY DEBATE ON 
POLICY ACTIVISM 1, available at http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/objects/11/11640/rohlf 
_keynes_and_classical.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). “[T]he most important element of 
classical economic thought was the belief that a market economy would automatically tend 
toward full employment.” Id. at 1-2. 
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government failures in public goods.22 The economic subsidy theory 
predicts that free riding and majoritarianism will also cause market 
failures and government failures in charitable goods because they 
often resemble public goods.23 It also argues that the charitable 
contribution deduction eliminates the inefficiency caused by those 
market failures and government failures by indirectly subsidizing 
charitable contributions.24 
A. Nonprofits and Charities 
A nonprofit organization (“nonprofit”) is an organization that is 
subject to the nondistribution constraint, which provides that a 
nonprofit cannot distribute its assets to its controlling persons and 
must use its assets to advance the nonprofit’s social purpose.25 A 
charity is a nonprofit organization with a charitable purpose.26 All 
charities are nonprofit organizations, but not all nonprofit 
organizations are charities. Some nonprofits benefit their members, 
which is a non-charitable purpose, but many nonprofits benefit the 
public, which may be a charitable purpose.27 
Under federal law, an organization is a charity only if the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) determines that it is exempt from taxation 
under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which effectively defines a charity as a 
nonprofit organization that is “organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes,” among other things.28 However, many 
nonprofit organizations that satisfy the criteria set forth in § 501(c)(3) 
do not apply for tax-exempt status.29 Moreover, the criteria set forth 
 
22 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale 
for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 
54, 67–69 (1982). 
23 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113. 
24 See, e.g., id. In theory, the deduction “solves” market failures and government 
failures by enabling charities to provide the optimal amount of charitable goods. See id. 
25 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 56–57. 
26 See generally Charitable Organization, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Charitable_organization (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
27 See Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS, 
http://nccs.urban.org/resources/faq.cfm (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
28 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
29 For example, organizations with less than fifty thousand dollars in annual gross 
receipts are only required to file a 990-N, but many do not. Instructions for Form 990-EZ - 
Notices, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i990ez/ar02.html#d0e5162 (last visited Aug. 
3, 2014); Scope of the Nonprofit Sector, INDEPENDENT SECTOR, http://www.independent 
sector.org/scope_of_the_sector (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
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in § 501(c)(3), as interpreted by the IRS, may not exhaust the scope of 
charitable purposes. 
The customary definition of charity may include purposes and 
organizations excluded by the federal statutory definition. “Charity” 
is generally defined as “[t]he voluntary giving of help, typically in the 
form of money, to those in need,” and a “charity” is generally defined 
as “[a]n organization set up to provide help and raise money for those 
in need.”30 
Accordingly, purposes and organizations that are not defined as 
charities under federal law may still be charitable in a colloquial 
sense. More specifically, while an organization is not a charity under 
federal law unless the IRS determines that it is exempt from taxation 
in accordance with § 501(c)(3), most people would agree that an 
organization is a charity if it has a charitable purpose, whether or not 
it has registered with the IRS or can qualify for federal tax-exempt 
status. 
B. Charitable Contributions 
Federal law defines a charitable contribution as a donation to a 
charity, and most charitable contributions are potentially tax 
deductible.31 In other words, taxpayers may be able to deduct 
charitable contributions from their taxable income.32 Taxpayers 
deduct a substantial amount of charitable contributions. For example, 
in 2010, taxpayers claimed about $291 billion in charitable 
contribution deductions.33 
However, many donations that satisfy the popular definition of a 
“charitable contribution” do not satisfy the federal definition. Either 
the organization that receives the donation has not applied for tax-
 
30 Charity, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition 
/american_english/charity (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
31 See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a). 
32 Tax income is defined as gross income less any deductions.  See What Is Taxable and 
Nontaxable Income?, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self           
-Employed/What-is-Taxable-and-Nontaxable-Income (last visited July 15, 2014). 
33 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE 
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND], available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html 
?func=select&id=50 (click “JCX 55-11”). 
FRYE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2014  1:24 PM 
162 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 155 
exempt status, or the recipient of the donation does not qualify as a 
charity under § 501(c)(3).34 
C. The Economic Subsidy Theory  
The charitable contribution deduction indirectly subsidizes the 
production of charitable goods by reducing the cost of charitable 
contributions.35 When taxpayers deduct charitable contributions from 
their taxable income, they reduce their tax burden and the government 
receives less tax revenue. Effectively, the deduction provides a 
government subsidy to the charities chosen by the taxpayers who 
make deductible charitable contributions. Every year, the deduction 
results in an indirect government subsidy of about $25 billion to 
charities.36 
Scholars disagree about the purpose of the charitable contribution 
deduction. Some argue that it rewards altruism.37 Others argue that it 
provides a more accurate measurement of the income of a charitable 
donor.38 And still others argue that the deduction is ineffective or 
improper, and that it should be eliminated.39 
The prevailing theory of the charitable contribution deduction 
holds that the deduction is an economic subsidy intended to mitigate 
market failures and government failures in charitable goods.40 
 
34 For example, giving alms to a panhandler satisfies the popular definition of charity 
but not the federal definition because a donation to an individual cannot be a charitable 
contribution. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
35 See PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 2–3. 
36 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, FISCAL YEAR 2001 at 117 tbl.5-3 (2000), available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/usbanalytical/BUDGET-2001-PER.pdf; 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE 
FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 45 
(2005), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-29-05.pdf. 
37 TERESA ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME 236 (1990) (“Charitable policy is 
currently enacted through a tax code premised on the notion that individual philanthropy is 
altruistic and should be rewarded.”); Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax 
Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 60–61 (1972). 
38 William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 309, 314–15 (1972); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions 
Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1414–15 (1988). 
39 Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” 
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 
880 (1979); Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A 
Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 379 (1972). 
40 See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2010) 
(“Modern commentators view the deduction for charitable contributions as a federal 
subsidy to the recipient firms and argue that the subsidy is justified as a tool for 
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According to this economic subsidy theory, free riding creates market 
failures by causing the market to undersupply charitable goods, and 
majoritarianism creates government failures by causing the 
government to undersupply charitable goods. The charitable 
contribution deduction solves these market and government failures 
by subsidizing the production of charitable goods.41 
D. Market Failures in Public Goods 
Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market 
failures in public goods.42 A market failure exists when the market 
allocation of a good is inefficient.43 Efficient markets are “Pareto 
optimal,” meaning that no one’s welfare can be increased without 
decreasing someone else’s welfare.44 A market failure exists when 
someone’s welfare could be increased without decreasing anyone’s 
welfare.45 
A public good is a good that is non-rival and non-excludable.46 A 
good is non-rival if its consumption does not reduce its availability 
and is non-excludable if its consumption cannot be prevented.47 For 
example, in the absence of intellectual property laws, ideas and 
expressions are public goods because they can be consumed an 
infinite number of times, and their consumption cannot be prevented. 
 
encouraging the production of goods that would otherwise be underproduced by the 
private market.”). 
41 See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable 
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 698 (2001) [hereinafter The Marketing of Philanthropy]; 
Gergen, supra note 38, at 1394; Hansmann, supra note 22, at 68, 71; David E. Pozen, 
Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 547 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, 
Assessing the “Contract Failure” Explanation for Nonprofit Organizations and Their Tax-
Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1997). 
42 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113; Hansmann, supra note 22, at 67–
69. 
43 See Market Failures, Public Goods, and Externalities, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/marketfailures.html (last visited Aug. 4, 
2014). 
44 See Pareto Efficiency, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pareto  
-efficiency.asp (last visited Aug. 4, 2014); Vilfredo Pareto, Biography in The Concise 
Encyclopedia of Economics, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library 
/Enc/bios/Pareto.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
45 See Market Failures, Public Goods, and Externalities, supra note 43; Pareto 
Efficiency, supra note 44; Vilfredo Pareto, supra note 44. 
46 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, LIBR. OF 
ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2014). 
47 See id. 
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Common examples of public goods include fresh air, lighthouses, 
national defense, flood control systems, and street lighting. 
Free riding is the consumption of a good without paying the 
marginal cost of production.48 Public goods are vulnerable to free 
riding because they are non-rival and non-excludable; everyone who 
wants to consume a public good can consume it, and the producer of 
the good cannot stop them from consuming it. Free riding causes 
market failures in public goods because no one is willing to pay the 
marginal cost of production. 
E. Government Failures in Public Goods 
Public choice theory predicts that majoritarianism will cause 
government failures in public goods.49 Government failures are 
inefficiencies in government regulation of the market allocation of a 
good.50 In theory, governments can solve market failures in public 
goods by subsidizing their production and taxing their consumption, 
thereby forcing the consumers of a good to pay its marginal cost of 
production. In other words, government can compensate for free 
riding on public goods and ensure that the optimal quantity of a public 
good is produced; when government fails to do this, a government 
failure exists.51 
Majoritarianism creates government failures in public goods 
because it causes governments to satisfy the preferences of the 
median voter.52 Majoritarian governments have an incentive to solve 
market failures if they affect the median voter but do not have an 
incentive to solve market failures that only affect political 
minorities.53 As a result, a majoritarian government’s ability to solve 
market failures in a public good depends on the uniformity of demand 
for that good. 
Majoritarian governments can solve market failures in a public 
good when demand is uniform because the supply of the good 
 
48 See generally id. (providing the example of people watching fireworks from their 
backyards without paying for the show). 
49 See, e.g., The Marketing of Philanthropy, supra note 41, at 698; Hansmann, supra 
note 22, at 68, 71. 
50 See The Marketing of Philanthropy, supra note 41, at 698. 
51 Id. 
52 “Median voter” refers to someone who is not at either extreme of public opinion but 
who instead “sits squarely in the middle of public opinion.” Tyler Cowen, Why Politics Is 
Stuck in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07 
/business/economy/07view.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Why Politics Is Stuck]. 
53 Id. 
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demanded by the median voter will compensate for free riding. For 
example, the demand for drinking water is relatively uniform, so 
governments can often solve market failures in drinking water by 
building waterworks or subsidizing their private construction. 
But majoritarian governments cannot solve market failures 
involving a public good when demand is not uniform because the 
median voter demand will not compensate for free riding. If the 
median voter’s demand for a public good is low but a political 
minority’s demand is high, a majoritarian government will only 
subsidize production of the good until the median voter’s demand is 
satisfied.54 In other words, majoritarian governments can compensate 
for free riding by the median voter but cannot compensate for free 
riding by political minorities. As a result, majoritarianism causes 
government failures in public goods disproportionately demanded by 
political minorities. 
F. Charitable Goods Resemble Public Goods 
The economic subsidy theory argues that charitable goods are 
vulnerable to free riding and majoritarianism because they resemble 
public goods.55 Many charitable goods resemble public goods 
because they are effectively non-rival or non-excludable. For 
example, public art is practically non-rival because it can be 
consumed by an indefinite number of people, and it is practically non-
excludable because it is available for public consumption. It follows 
that free riding should cause market failures in charitable goods to the 
extent that they resemble public goods. 
Demand for charitable goods is rarely uniform. Often, the median 
voter’s demand for a charitable good is low, but a political minority’s 
demand is high for the charitable good.56 For example, the median 
voter’s demand for a homeless shelter is low, but a homeless person’s 
demand is high. Thus, majoritarianism should cause government 
failures in charitable goods disproportionately demanded by political 
minorities.57 
 
54 See, e.g., id. 
55 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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II 
THE ECONOMIC SUBSIDY THEORY OF CHARITY LAW 
A. Charity Law Solves Market and Government Failures in 
Charitable Goods 
1. The Economic Subsidy Theory 
The economic subsidy theory argues that the charitable 
contribution deduction is justified because it solves market failures 
and government failures in charitable goods.58 If free riding causes 
market failures in charitable goods that resemble public goods and 
majoritarianism causes government failures in charitable goods 
demanded by political minorities, then we should expect an inefficient 
market in charitable goods demanded by political minorities. The 
economic subsidy theory argues that the deduction solves these 
market and government failures by indirectly subsidizing the 
production of charitable goods. 
In theory, political minorities can solve market and government 
failures in charitable goods they demand by subsidizing the 
production of those goods themselves. In other words, members of a 
political minority may form a charity to produce the goods they 
demand and make contributions to that charity. 
2. The Problem of Free Riding 
Charitable contributions are vulnerable to free riding. The people 
who demand a charitable good benefit when others contribute to 
charities that produce that good—regardless of whether the 
demanding person makes a contribution. While altruism will motivate 
some members of a political minority to make charitable 
contributions,59 it may not fully compensate for free riding on 
charitable contributions. As a consequence, a charity may receive 
insufficient contributions to offset market failures and government 
failures in a charitable good, resulting in a shortage of the charitable 
good. 
The economic subsidy theory argues that the charitable 
contribution deduction is justified because it solves market failures 
and government failures in charitable goods by subsidizing charitable 
 
58 Id. 
59 See PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 36. 
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contributions, thereby compensating for free riding.60 The deduction 
indirectly subsidizes charitable contributions by allowing taxpayers to 
deduct their contributions from their taxable income.61 For example, 
if the income tax rate is 25%, taxpayers with $100 of taxable income 
ordinarily pay $25 in taxes on that income (assuming the taxpayer has 
other income). But the charitable contribution deduction allows 
taxpayers with $100 of taxable income who donate that entire amount 
to a charity to deduct their contribution from their taxable income. 
Thus, when the taxpayers donate $100, they have no taxable income 
remaining and thereby avoid $25 in taxes. As a result, the net cost to 
taxpayers of the $100 charitable contribution is only $75. Even if the 
taxpayer had not donated $100, they still would have lost $25 to 
income tax. The deduction enables the taxpayers to avoid paying $25 
in income tax. Effectively, $100 donation to the charity consists of 
$75 donated directly by the taxpayer and $25 in uncollected tax 
revenue donated indirectly by the government. 
3. How the Deduction Solves Market Failures and Government 
Failures 
In theory, the deduction can solve market failures in charitable 
goods by providing a subsidy that compensates for free riding on 
charitable contributions. For example, if a charity needs $100 to 
satisfy the demand for a charitable good but free riding results in only 
$75 in contributions, the charitable contribution deduction can 
compensate for free riding by providing a subsidy of $25. 
The deduction can also solve government failures in charitable 
goods by subsidizing the production of charitable goods indirectly. 
Direct subsidies of charitable goods are vulnerable to majoritarianism 
because majoritarian governments will only subsidize the production 
of charitable goods when the median voter’s demand is not 
satisfied.62 This scenario causes government failures in charitable 
goods demanded by political minorities. The indirect subsidy 
provided by the deduction can solve some of those government 
failures by enabling political minorities to determine which charitable 
goods receive a subsidy. 
Moreover, the deduction is likely to subsidize the production of 
charitable goods affected by market failures and government failures. 
 
60 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113. 
61 See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a) (2012). 
62 See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
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Charitable contributions are motivated at least in part by altruism, or 
concern for the welfare of others.63 One form of altruism is paying for 
a public good instead of free riding. Accordingly, altruistic charitable 
contributions are likely to pay for charitable goods that are vulnerable 
to free riding and thereby help solve market failures. Another form of 
altruism is giving to those in need. While majoritarian governments 
tend to satisfy the preferences of the median voter, they tend not to 
satisfy the preferences of political minorities,64 so those in need tend 
to be political minorities. Altruistic charitable contributions are likely 
to pay for charitable goods that are vulnerable to majoritarianism and 
thereby help solve government failures. If altruistic charitable 
contributions tend to solve actual market failures and government 
failures, it follows that the subsidy provided by the contributions’ tax 
deductions will also tend to solve actual market failures and 
government failures. 
4. Limits to Solving Market Failures and Government Failures 
Of course, the charitable contribution deduction does not and 
cannot actually solve all market and government failures in charitable 
goods. To begin with, the deduction can only compensate for free 
riding on charitable contributions that are made. Some taxpayers may 
choose not to contribute and others may lack the resources. 
In addition, the deduction is inherently inefficient. The subsidy it 
provides is not correlated to the actual amount of free riding on a 
charitable donation. Instead, the subsidy provided by the deduction is 
determined by a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. As a result, there is no 
reason to believe that the subsidy provided by the deduction is 
equivalent to the positive externalities produced by the contribution 
because the two are unrelated to each other.65 
Nevertheless, perhaps something is better than nothing. While 
there is no reason to believe that the charitable contribution deduction 
efficiently solves market and government failures in charitable goods, 
presumably it solves or aids at least some of them. 
 
63 Altruism, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition 
/american_english/altruism (last visited Aug. 5, 2014); see PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 36. 
64 Why Politics Is Stuck, supra note 52. 
65 A positive externality occurs when “the consumption or production of a good causes 
a benefit to a third party.” Positive Externalities, ECONOMICS HELP, http://www 
.economicshelp.org/micro-economic-essays/marketfailure/positive-externality/ (last visited 
May 29, 2014). For example, education results in a positive externality; the individual 
receives a benefit, but society as a whole also benefits. Id. 
FRYE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2014  1:24 PM 
2014] Solving Charity Failures 169 
B. Vertical Equity and Distributive Justice 
While the economic subsidy theory argues that the charitable 
contribution deduction solves market and government failures in 
charitable goods, critics respond that it lacks vertical equity and 
reduces distributive justice.66 Specifically, they argue that the 
deduction lacks vertical equity because it benefits high-income 
taxpayers more than low-income taxpayers, and that it reduces 
distributive justice because it benefits rich people more than poor 
people.67 Critics argue that the deduction benefits high-income 
taxpayers more than low-income taxpayers by providing a larger 
subsidy to high-income taxpayers.68 As explained above, the subsidy 
provided by the charitable contribution deduction is determined by 
the donor’s marginal income tax rate: the higher the rate, the larger 
the subsidy and the lower the rate, the smaller the subsidy.69 
The federal income tax rate is graduated, meaning that a taxpayer’s 
marginal income tax rate increases as the taxpayer’s taxable income 
increases.70 There are currently seven income tax brackets for single 
taxpayers, ranging from 10% on taxable income less than $9,075 to 
39.6% on taxable income more than $406,750.71 As a result, the 
charitable contribution deduction provides a larger subsidy to high-
income taxpayers than it does to low-income taxpayers. To illustrate, 
a taxpayer in the 10% tax bracket who makes a $100 charitable 
contribution receives a $10 subsidy, but a taxpayer in the 39.6% tax 
bracket who makes a $100 charitable contribution receives a $39.60 
subsidy. 
Moreover, the charitable contribution deduction cannot subsidize 
the charitable contributions made by most low-income taxpayers 
because they generally do not itemize their deductions.72 Taxable 
 
66 See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of 
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 508–09 (2010). 
67 See id. at 549–50. 
68 See id.; Benshalom, supra note 17, at 1057. 
69 See Charitable Contribution Deductions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non   
-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Charitable-Contribution-Deductions (last updated Nov. 
1, 2013) [hereinafter Charitable Contribution Deductions]. 
70 See generally 2013 Tax Table, IRS 74-85, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040tt.pdf 
(last visited May 29, 2014) [hereinafter 2013 Tax Table]. 
71 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX WITHHOLDING AND ESTIMATED TAX 19 (Mar. 16, 
2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p505.pdf. 
72 Benjamin H. Harris & Daniel Baneman, Who Itemizes Deductions?, TAX POL’Y CTR. 
(Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001486-Who-Itemizes-Deductions 
.pdf. 
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income is defined as gross income less any deductions.73 Taxpayers 
may claim either a standard deduction or the sum of their itemized 
deductions.74 The charitable contribution deduction is an itemized 
deduction.75 Therefore, taxpayers can deduct their charitable 
contributions only if they claim itemized deductions; they cannot 
deduct their charitable contributions if they claim a standard 
deduction. Most low-income taxpayers claim a standard deduction 
rather than itemized deductions because the standard deduction is 
larger than the sum of their itemized deductions.76 Accordingly, most 
low-income taxpayers cannot deduct their charitable contributions, 
and the charitable contribution deduction cannot subsidize their 
charitable contributions.77 
Critics of the charitable contribution deduction also argue that it 
benefits the rich more than the poor because it tends to subsidize 
charitable goods consumed by the rich rather than charitable goods 
consumed by the poor.78 For example, the rich tend to consume 
charitable goods produced by museums and universities, while the 
poor tend to consume charitable goods produced by food banks and 
homeless shelters.79 Donors tend to contribute to charities that 
produce charitable goods that they personally consume.80 
Because rich people make more charitable contributions,81 it 
follows that the charitable contribution deduction tends to subsidize 
charitable goods consumed by the rich rather than charitable goods 
consumed by the poor. Obviously, the rich are capable of making 
larger charitable contributions than the poor, simply because they 
have more wealth to contribute. And increasing income and wealth 
inequality may have increased this disparity regarding the capacity to 
make charitable contributions.82 
 
73 See What Is Taxable and Nontaxable Income?, supra note 32. 
74 Harris & Baneman, supra note 72. 
75 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS, SCHEDULE A (2013), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sa.pdf. 
76 See PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 37. 
77 Id. 
78 See ODENDAHL, supra note 37, at 3. 
79 See Fleischer, supra note 66, at 549. 
80 See id. (citing Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Equality, in 
TAKING PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY: BEYOND NOBLE INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE 
GIVING 27–49 (William Damon & Susan Verducci eds., 2007)); ODENDAHL, supra note 
37, at 3). 
81 See ODENDAHL, supra note 37, at 3. 
82 Thomas Piketty & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth and Inheritance in the Long Run 1, 17–
18 (Apr. 6, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/PikettyZucman2014HID.pdf. 
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Moreover, the rich have a larger incentive to make charitable 
contributions compared to the poor based on the fact that the rich tend 
to receive a larger subsidy. Wealthy people often earn large incomes, 
and poor people tend to have low incomes, so the structure of the 
charitable contribution deduction amplifies the subsidy of charitable 
goods consumed by the rich. However, these important normative 
criticisms of the charitable contribution deduction do not address the 
empirical claim that it solves market and government failures in at 
least some charitable goods. 
C. Charity Failures 
While critics of the charitable contribution deduction argue that the 
deduction reduces distributive justice and lacks vertical equity, the 
deduction is also vulnerable to criticism on efficiency grounds. In 
fact, the economic subsidy theory of the deduction implies that it 
causes “charity failures,” or failures to solve market failures and 
government failures in charitable goods consumed by low-income 
taxpayers. 
1. What Is a Charity Failure? 
According to the economic subsidy theory, the charitable 
contribution deduction solves market and government failures for 
charitable goods by subsidizing charitable contributions, thereby 
compensating for free riding and encouraging more people to 
donate.83 This subsidy compensates for free riding on charitable 
goods by creating an incentive for marginal donors to contribute to 
the charities that produce those goods: the larger the subsidy, the 
stronger the incentive; the smaller the subsidy, the weaker the 
incentive.84 But the charitable contribution deduction can compensate 
for free riding only to the extent that it can subsidize charitable 
contributions. If it cannot subsidize a donor’s contributions, it cannot 
create an incentive for that donor to make contributions. And if the 
deduction cannot subsidize certain contributions, it cannot 
compensate for market and government failures associated with those 
contributions, causing “charity failures,” or inefficiencies in the 
charitable subsidy. 
 
83 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113. 
84 See id. 
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2. Who Is Affected by Charity Failures? 
The economic subsidy theory also implies that charity failures are 
more likely to affect low-income taxpayers than high-income 
taxpayers because the charitable contribution deduction provides a 
larger subsidy to high-income taxpayers than to low-income taxpayers 
and cannot provide any subsidy to most low-income taxpayers. 
First, charity failures are more likely to affect low-income 
taxpayers than high-income taxpayers because high-income taxpayers 
receive a much larger subsidy from the charitable contribution 
deduction.85 In theory, the size of the subsidy provided by the 
charitable contribution deduction should affect the number and value 
of charitable contributions. Empirical studies of the effect of the 
charitable contribution deduction lend qualified support to this 
hypothesis. Some studies have found that changing the size of the 
subsidy causes a disproportionately larger change in the number and 
value of charitable contributions.86 Other studies have found a weaker 
or more qualified response, suggesting that changes in the size of the 
subsidy may have a limited effect on the number and value of 
charitable contributions.87 
It follows that high-income taxpayers should respond in a more 
correlative fashion to changes in the subsidy than low-income 
taxpayers, as high-income taxpayers tend to receive a larger subsidy 
than low-income taxpayers. In fact, many low-income taxpayers 
receive no subsidy at all.88 Several studies have shown that changes 
in the charitable deduction subsidy cause a larger change in the 
charitable contributions of high-income taxpayers compared to low-
income taxpayers.89 
 
85 See Charitable Contribution Deductions, supra note 69; 2013 Tax Table, supra note 
70. 
86 See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE 
GIVING (1985) (presenting econometric analysis of the relationship between federal taxes 
and charitable giving); Daniel Feenberg, Are Tax Price Models Really Identified: The Case 
of Charitable Giving, 40 NAT’L TAX J. 629, 632 (1987). 
87 Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg & Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable Giving, Income, 
and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 380–81 (2002); Jon 
Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives and 
Income? New Estimates from Panel Data, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 615, 692 (2011); William C. 
Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable 
Contributions, 103 J. POL. ECON. 709, 735 (1995). 
88 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
89 Bakija & Heim, supra note 87, at 642; Charles T. Clotfelter, The Impact of Tax 
Reform on Charitable Giving: A 1989 Perspective, 7 (NBER Working Paper No. 3273, 
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Of course, many low-income taxpayers make charitable 
contributions despite the fact they receive only a small subsidy. In 
2011, the Joint Committee on Taxation projected that 216,000 
taxpayers filed itemized tax returns reporting $10,000 or less with a 
$1250 average of charitable contributions per return but only a $72 
average subsidy.90 By contrast, a taxpayer in the 39.6% tax bracket 
would have received a $495 subsidy for the same contribution of 
$1250. 
Furthermore, many taxpayers contribute to a charity even though 
they receive no subsidy at all. In 2008, charitable organizations 
reported $229.28 billion in individual contributions, but individual 
itemized tax returns claimed only $172.9 billion in charitable 
contributions.91 This suggests that individual taxpayers give nearly 
$56.4 billion in charitable contributions for which they received no 
subsidy whatsoever.92 Presumably, some taxpayers who filed 
itemized returns failed to claim some of their charitable contributions, 
and some charities may have claimed more contributions than they 
actually received. But taxpayers who did not file itemized returns 
made many of these unclaimed charitable contributions, and they 
thereby missed out on subsidies they would have received. 
“Hypersalience,” or the mistaken belief that a deduction applies, 
may compensate for free riding on some unsubsidized charitable 
contributions.93 A deduction is “salient” when it creates an incentive 
for the taxpayers it affects, and is “hypersalient” when it creates an 
incentive for taxpayers it does not affect but who believe they are 
affected.94 The charitable contribution deduction may be hypersalient 
because it appears to create an incentive for some non-itemizing 
taxpayers to make contributions even though they cannot claim the 
deduction. In other words, some non-itemizing taxpayers appear to 
make charitable contributions because they believe that the 
contributions will be deductible even though they are not.95 
 
1990), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226702 (click on 
“Download This Paper”). 
90 PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 37 tbl.2. 
91 Id. at 39 tbls.2, 3. 
92 Id. at 37–38. 
93 Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An Introduction 
to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1309 (2012). 
94 Id. at 1309, 1311. 
95 Id. at 1340. 
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However, hypersalience probably cannot fully compensate for free 
riding on all unsubsidized charitable contributions. While the 
deduction appears to be hypersalient for some non-itemizing 
taxpayers, it is almost certainly not hypersalient for all non-itemizing 
taxpayers. At least some non-itemizing taxpayers must realize that 
they cannot claim the deduction based on information provided by the 
IRS, professional tax preparers, or their own experience of the IRS 
denying a claimed deduction. Moreover, while the deduction may be 
hypersalient to non-itemizers, presumably it is more salient and 
provides a larger incentive to taxpayers who actually receive a 
subsidy than taxpayers who do not. Accordingly, while hypersalience 
probably reduces charity failures, it is unlikely to eliminate them 
because it cannot fully compensate for the difference between the 
subsidy provided to low-income and high-income taxpayers. 
While the charitable contribution deduction creates a strong 
incentive for high-income taxpayers to make charitable contributions, 
it creates, at best, a weak incentive for low-income taxpayers to make 
charitable contributions. Therefore, the economic subsidy theory 
implies that the charitable contribution deduction compensates for 
free riding on high-income taxpayers’ charitable contributions more 
effectively than it compensates for free riding on low-income 
taxpayers’ charitable contributions. The deduction provides a larger 
incentive to marginal high-income donors than to marginal low-
income donors. 
The economic subsidy theory additionally implies that the 
charitable contribution deduction will tend to cause charity failures in 
charitable goods consumed by low-income taxpayers. If donors 
contribute to charities that produce the charitable goods they 
personally consume, this implies that the market of charitable goods 
consumed by high-income taxpayers is more efficient than the market 
of charitable goods consumed by low-income taxpayers. It also means 
that charities that produce goods that high-income taxpayers consume 
are more likely to receive the optimal amount of contributions. And if 
the deduction provides a weak incentive for low-income individuals 
to make charitable contributions, then charities that produce 
charitable goods consumed by low-income taxpayers are less likely to 
receive the optimal amount of contributions. 
In other words, the economic subsidy theory implies that the 
charitable contribution deduction is more likely to solve market 
failures and government failures in charitable goods consumed by 
high-income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers. As a result, the 
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economic subsidy theory implies that the charitable contribution 
deduction will tend to cause charities to supply the optimal amount of 
charitable goods consumed by high-income taxpayers but 
undersupply charitable goods consumed by low-income taxpayers. 
III 
SOLVING CHARITY FAILURES 
A. Reforming the Charitable Contribution Deduction 
Charitable contribution deduction critics argue that it is unfair. 
They have proposed several reforms intended to increase 
distributional justice and improve vertical equity.96 The proposed 
reforms include: reducing the subsidy that the charitable contribution 
deduction provides to high-income taxpayers, allowing non-itemizing 
taxpayers to claim the charitable contribution deduction, providing a 
tax credit to low-income taxpayers who make charitable 
contributions, and providing direct grants to charities.97 
These proposed reforms may increase distributional justice and 
improve vertical equity, but they cannot solve the charity failures 
caused by the charitable contribution deduction because none of them 
can efficiently compensate the low-income taxpayers for the free 
riding on their charitable contributions. 
Reducing the subsidy for high-income taxpayers may improve 
vertical equity, but it cannot solve charity failures because this 
strategy does nothing to compensate for free riding on charitable 
contributions. On the contrary, it could increase charity failures while 
reducing the marginal incentive for high-income taxpayers to make 
charitable contributions.98 
1. Solving Charity Failures Through Tax Policy 
In theory, the government could solve charity failures though the 
tax code by extending the charitable contribution deduction to non-
 
96 See, e.g., House Tax Reform Proposal Limits Charitable Deduction for All, 
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.philanthropynewsdigest.org /news 
/house-tax-reform-proposal-limits-charitable-deduction-for-all (proposing a reform that 
limits the charitable deduction for all income levels to only those donations that are in 
excess of two percent of the taxpayer’s gross income). 
97 JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 808–27 (4th ed. 2010). 
98 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, 
and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 256 (2009). 
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itemizers or offering tax credits for charitable contributions to low-
income taxpayers. However, tax-based solutions to charity failures are 
likely to be inefficient and costly. 
a. Extending the Deduction to Non-Itemizers 
Allowing non-itemizing taxpayers to claim the charitable 
contribution deduction would solve some, but not all, charity failures. 
The subsidy for low-income taxpayers under this model is not large 
enough to compensate for free riding. 
Several studies have found that low-income taxpayers do not 
respond strongly to changes in the subsidy provided by the charitable 
contribution deduction.99 From 1982 to 1986, non-itemizing 
taxpayers could deduct an increasing percentage of their charitable 
contributions.100 While charitable contributions by non-itemizing 
taxpayers increased when their maximum charitable contribution 
deduction increased, the response was smaller than the response of 
itemizing taxpayers.101 Moreover, much of the increase in charitable 
contributions by non-itemizing taxpayers was attributable to 
taxpayers choosing not to itemize in order to receive a larger 
deduction, rather than taxpayers choosing to increase their charitable 
contributions.102 
b. Providing Tax Credits for Charitable Contributions to Low- Income 
Taxpayers 
Providing a tax credit to low-income taxpayers who make 
charitable contributions cannot solve charity failures because it would 
be costly, inefficient, and often ineffective. The diminishing marginal 
utility of consumption103 makes it more expensive to induce a low-
 
99 See Joseph Cordes, John O’Hare & Eugene Steuerle, Extending the Charitable 
Deduction to Nonitemizers: Policy Issues and Options, 7 URBAN INST. 1, 4 (2000); David 
H. Eaton, Charitable Contributions and Tax Price Elasticities for Nonitemizing 
Taxpayers, 7 IAER 431, 432 (2001); cf. Christopher M. Duquette, Is Charitable Giving by 
Nonitemizers Responsive to Tax Incentives? New Evidence, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 195, 202 
(1999). 
100 In 1982 and 1983, non-itemizing taxpayers could deduct 25% of their first $100 in 
charitable contributions; in 1984, they could deduct 25% of their first $300 in charitable 
contributions; in 1985, they could deduct half of their charitable contributions; and in 1986 
they could deduct all of their charitable contributions. Eaton, supra note 99, at 431–32. 
101 Duquette, supra note 99, at 203; Eaton, supra note 99, at 441. 
102 See Duquette, supra note 99, at 196, 199–200. 
103 The “diminishing marginal utility of consumption” refers to the notion that, while 
consumption of other products remains the same, a consumer experiences “a decline in the 
marginal utility that person derives from consuming each additional unit of that product.” 
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income taxpayer to make a charitable contribution than to induce a 
high-income taxpayer to make a charitable contribution.104 
Presumably, the cost of inducing enough low-income taxpayers to 
make charitable contributions would soon exceed the amount of those 
charitable contributions. Moreover, to the extent that the charitable 
contribution is hypersalient, some low-income taxpayers are making 
charitable contributions in the mistaken belief that they can deduct 
those contributions and receive a subsidy.105 Presumably, providing 
an actual subsidy via a tax credit will have a limited effect on their 
charitable contributions. 
More importantly, most low-income taxpayers could not receive a 
tax credit because they do not itemize their deductions. In 2010, only 
about 30% of taxpayers itemized; the number of low-income 
taxpayers who itemized was even lower.106 Fewer than 4% of 
taxpayers in the 0% tax bracket itemized, and about 16% of taxpayers 
in the 10% bracket itemized.107 Many low-income taxpayers have no 
tax liability and do not bother to file tax returns at all.108 
2. Solving Charity Failures Through Grants 
The government could also solve charity failures by providing 
direct grants to charities, but this approach will be inefficient because 
majoritarianism makes it vulnerable to government failures. The 
economic subsidy theory argues that the government can solve market 
failures in charitable goods demanded by political majorities but 
cannot solve market failures in goods demanded by political 
minorities.109 In other words, the government would likely give direct 
grants to charities that produce charitable goods demanded by 
political majorities but would not give direct grants to charities that 
produce goods demanded by political minorities. As a result, direct 
 
Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms 
/l/lawofdiminishingutility.asp (last visited May 29, 2014). An example of this concept 
exists in buffet restaurants: “each additional plate of food provides less utility than the one 
before.” Id. 
104 Schizer, supra note 98, at 234. 
105 Faulhaber, supra note 93, at 1340. 
106 Harris & Baneman, supra note 72. 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., Scott A. Hodge, Number of Americans Paying Zero Federal Income Tax 
Grows to 43.4 Million, TAX FOUND (Mar. 30, 2006), http://taxfoundation.org/article 
/number-americans-paying-zero-federal-income-tax-grows-434-million. In 2006, about 
fifteen million individuals and families were not required to file tax returns. Id. 
109 See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text. 
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grants can only solve charity failures in charitable goods demanded 
by political majorities and cannot solve charity failures in charitable 
goods demanded by political minorities. For example, if a political 
minority consisting of low-income taxpayers demands a charitable 
good, charity failures will cause an undersupply of the good because 
the charitable contribution deduction cannot subsidize contributions 
to charities that produce the good. Government failures will also 
prevent the government from solving those charity failures because 
the good is not demanded by a political majority. 
B. Crowdfunding 
If the economic subsidy theory of the charitable contribution 
deduction is correct, it implies that we should expect it to cause 
charity failures in charitable goods consumed by political minorities 
of low-income taxpayers. This Article argues that crowdfunding is 
successful because it solves at least some of the charity failures 
caused by the charitable contribution deduction by using rewards, 
rather than subsidies, to compensate for free riding on donations made 
by low-income taxpayers. 
In other words, the remarkable success of crowdfunding110 
supports the hypothesis of the economic subsidy theory by showing 
that charity failures exist and that they can be solved. Of course, 
crowdfunding cannot solve all charity failures. But examining its 
successes may help identify charity failures that can be solved by 
other means. 
Crowdfunding is a way of using the Internet to ask the public for 
contributions to fund a project.111 It is a form of crowdsourcing, or 
using the Internet to ask the public to help accomplish a task.112 
Crowdfunding makes it efficient to fund a project by asking many 
people for small amounts of money rather than asking a few people 
for large amounts of money.113 
 
110 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
111 See Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher, Crowdfunding: 
Tapping the Right Crowd, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 1, 2 (July 9, 2013), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1836873 (click “Download This Paper”). 
112 See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 2006), http://www.wired 
.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html. Crowdsourcing is a portmanteau of “crowd” and 
“outsourcing.” See id. 
113 Belleflamme, Lambert & Schwienbacher, supra note 111, at 2–3. 
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While the concept behind crowdfunding is old, Internet-based 
crowdfunding is quite new.114 Nevertheless, the use of crowdfunding 
has grown very rapidly. Crowdfunding organizations have 
proliferated and enabled individuals, organizations, and charities to 
raise substantial amounts of money for a wide range of projects, both 
domestically and internationally.115 
As discussed above, many different crowdfunding organizations 
provide many different crowdfunding platforms. A crowdfunding 
platform is a website that allows a recipient to describe a project and 
ask the public for contributions to the project.116 Depending on the 
crowdfunding platform, the recipient may also offer something in 
exchange for contributions.117 Most crowdfunding platforms require 
recipients to set a funding goal of a specific amount of money in a 
specific amount of time.118 Many crowdfunding platforms provide 
that contributions are contingent on the satisfaction of that funding 
goal.119 Most crowdfunding organizations charge a fee of five to ten 
percent of the contributions to a project.120 
Crowdfunding finances many different kinds of projects, but most 
crowdfunding platforms focus on a particular category of projects. 
For example, Spot.us focused on journalism;121 33needs and 
StartSomeGood focus on social enterprise;122 PROfounders, Startup 
Addict, and peerbackers focus on entrepreneurs;123 Kickstarter, 
Indiegogo, RocketHub, Hatchfund, and NewJelly focus on creative 
 
114 Bradford, supra note 14, at 11 (arguing that Internet-based crowdfunding began in 
2005). 
115 See id. at 11–14. 
116 Prive, supra note 9. 
117 See, e.g., Seven Things to Know About Kickstarter, supra note 5. 
118 See, e.g., id. 
119 See, e.g., id. 
120 See, e.g., Start Your Project., KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/learn?ref 
=what_is_kickstarter (last visited Aug. 7, 2014) (click “What is Kickstarter’s fee?”). 
121 Marianne McCarthy, Can You Still Spot.us? Crowdfunding Pioneer Slumps Under 
APM, PBS: MEDIASHIFT (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2012/12/can    
-you-still-spot-us-crowdfunding-pioneer-slumps-under-apm354/. 
122 How It Works: Criteria, STARTSOMEGOOD, http://startsomegood.com/Help/Values 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2014); 33needs, CROWDSOURCING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing 
.org/site/33needs/33needscom/2487 (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
123 About, STARTUP ADDICT, http://www.startupaddict.com/crowdfunding/page/about 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2014); About peerbackers, PEERBACKERS, http://peerbackers.com 
/media-kit/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014); PROFOUNDERS CAPITAL, http://www.profounders 
capital.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
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projects;124 PledgeMusic focuses on musicians;125 FirstGiving 
focuses on charities;126 DonorsChoose.org focuses on education;127 
ioby focuses on environmental projects;128AppsFunder focuses on 
mobile apps;129 and Quirky focuses on inventors.130 The market for 
crowdfunding platforms is quite volatile. New platforms are 
constantly appearing. Some are successful, and others disappear.131 
Crowdfunding is used for commercial or charitable purposes or a 
mixture of the two.132 For example, the Imagination Station created a 
crowdfunding project to create a statute of RoboCop in Detroit.133 
Under federal law, the Imagination Station is not a charity because it 
has not applied for tax-exempt status,134 but the project was intended 
to create a work of public art, which is a charitable purpose. Broadly 
speaking, one could say that a crowdfunded project has a commercial 
purpose to the extent that its purpose is to produce a commercial good 
and has a charitable purpose to the extent that its purpose is to 
produce a charitable good. 
Contributions to a charitable crowdfunded project may or may not 
be charitable contributions. Individuals, businesses, and charities can 
all use crowdfunding platforms to solicit contributions to 
crowdfunded projects.135 Some charitable crowdfunded projects are 
 
124 About Us, HATCHFUND, http://www.hatchfund.org/about/us (last visited Aug. 13, 
2014); About Us, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story, (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2014); About Us, NEWJELLY, http://www.newjelly.com/About-us/ (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2014); Seven Things to Know About Kickstarter, supra note 5; see Our 
Movement, ROCKETHUB, http://www.rockethub.com/about (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
125 PLEDGEMUSIC, http://www.pledgemusic.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
126 FIRSTGIVING, http://www.firstgiving.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
127 DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, http://www.donorschoose.org/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
128 About ioby, IOBY, http://www.ioby.org/about/our-story (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
129 APPSFUNDER, http://www.appsfunder.com/us (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
130 About, QUIRKY, https://www.quirky.com/about (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
131 For example, MicroPlace, which focused on microfinance, stopped operating on 
January 14, 2014. The Future of MicroPlace, MICROPLACE, www.microplace.com (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
132 See generally Bradford, supra note 14, at 12–15. Among other things, crowdfunding 
reminds us that charity takes many forms. See, e.g., Invest in Breasts, MY FREE IMPLANTS, 
http://myfreeimplants.com/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
133 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, supra note 2. 
134 See Exempt Organizations Select Check, supra note 4. 
135 See Bradford, supra note 14, at 15–16; see, e.g., id. at 25. 
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created by charities.136 Others are sponsored by charities but created 
by individuals or businesses.137 
If a charitable crowdfunded project is created or sponsored by a 
charity, contributions to the project are generally charitable 
contributions. But if it is not created or sponsored by a charity, 
contributions are not charitable contributions. While many 
crowdfunded projects have a charitable purpose, contributions to 
many of those projects are not charitable contributions. 
Most crowdfunding platforms are businesses operating for a 
profit.138 However, crowdfunding platforms administered by 
businesses may host projects created by charities, just as businesses 
may solicit charitable contributions on behalf of charities.139 And 
many crowdfunded projects created by individuals and businesses 
have a charitable purpose in a colloquial sense. For example, 
GiveForward enables individuals to create crowdfunding projects to 
raise funds for an individual’s medical treatment.140 While a 
contribution to an individual is not a charitable contribution under 
federal law, contributions to a person in need are charitable in a 
colloquial sense.141 
1. Models of Crowdfunding 
There are four distinct crowdfunding models, and they are defined 
by what recipients offer in exchange for contributions: (1) the 
donation model, (2) the reward model, (3) the loan model, and (4) the 
equity model.142 Many crowdfunding platforms use only one model, 
but some use multiple models.143 
 
136 See, e.g., id. at 15. 
137 See Gene Takagi, Fundraising & Charitable Giving: Nonprofit Crowdfunding 
Risks, NONPROFIT LAW BLOG (July 8, 2014), http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/category 
/fundraising/. 
138 See Bradford, supra note 14, at 142. 
139 4.76.51.3 Professional Fund-Raisers, IRS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/irm 
/part4/irm_04-076-051.html#d0e331. 
140 About Us–Online Fundraising Websites, GIVEFORWARD, http://www.giveforward 
.com/p/about-us (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
141 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
142 Bradford, supra note 14, at 14–15. Bradford’s pre-purchase model is omitted in this 
analysis because it is duplicative of the reward model. See id. 
143 Id. at 15. 
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a. The Donation Model 
Under the donation model, recipients offer nothing to donors in 
exchange for contributions.144 Unsurprisingly, the donation model is 
used primarily by crowdfunding platforms that focus on charitable 
projects.145 In fact, the crowdfunding platforms are often operated by 
charities and the recipients of the projects are usually charities.146 As 
a result, contributions to this model of crowdfunding projects are 
often deductible, as a contribution to a crowdfunded project is a 
charitable contribution if the recipient is a charity.147 Examples of 
crowdfunding platforms that use the donation model include 
GlobalGiving and DonorsChoose.org.148 
The donation model cannot solve the charity failures created by the 
charitable contribution deduction because it cannot compensate for 
free riding on charitable contributions made by low-income 
taxpayers. As explained above, the charitable contribution deduction 
causes charity failures because the deduction cannot subsidize many 
types of charitable contributions from low-income taxpayers.149 But 
while the donation model cannot solve charity failures by subsidizing 
contributions, it may mitigate charity failures associated with the 
charitable contribution deduction by reducing transaction costs. 
Donors tend to contribute to charities that produce the charitable 
goods they consume.150 But charities often produce many different 
kinds of charitable goods. Donors who only consume some of the 
charitable goods that a charity produces will have a stronger incentive 
to make a charitable contribution if the charity uses their contribution 
to produce the charitable goods they consume rather than the ones 
they do not. 
The donation model enables a charity to determine more efficiently 
the demand for each of the charitable goods it produces by asking 





147 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
148 See About GlobalGiving, GLOBALGIVING, http://www.globalgiving.org/aboutus/ 
(last visited Aug. 7, 2014); About: How It Works, DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, http://www 
.donorschoose.org/about (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
149 See supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text. 
150 See Fleischer, supra note 66, at 549 (citing Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy 
Relation to Equality, in TAKING PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY: BEYOND NOBLE 
INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE GIVING 27–49 (William Damon & Susan Verducci eds., 
2007)); ODENDAHL, supra note 37, at 3. 
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donations. Thus, the number and value of charitable contributions to a 
particular project more accurately reflect the donor demand for the 
charitable good produced by that project. If a project is funded, the 
charity knows that demand is high, and it can produce the charitable 
good in question; if a project is not funded, the charity can reevaluate 
the demand for that charitable good. 
In other words, the donation model of crowdsourcing may mitigate 
some charity failures by reducing transaction costs. But it cannot 
solve the charity failures caused by the charitable contribution 
deduction because the donation model cannot subsidize charitable 
contributions from low-income taxpayers. Without an alternative 
subsidy, the donation model cannot compensate for free riding on 
contributions made by low-income taxpayers. 
b. The Reward Model 
Under the reward model, recipients offer rewards to donors in 
exchange for contributions.151 The reward model is used by 
crowdfunding platforms that focus on both charitable and commercial 
projects.152 While the reward for contributing to a project can be 
almost anything, rewards generally relate to the particular project in 
question and depend on the size of the contribution.153 A reward may 
have any value, and the perceived value of a reward often depends on 
the size of the contribution.154 Contributors who make small 
contributions receive low-value rewards; contributors who make large 
contributions receive high-value rewards.155 Low-value rewards often 
include postcards, e-mails, or some form of recognition. High-value 
rewards are often unique and closely related to the recipient of the 
contribution.156 For example, an artist may offer a unique art object in 
exchange for a large contribution or a filmmaker may offer an 
executive producer credit.157 
Historically, large charities and charities that operated a medium of 
mass communication, like public radio and television stations, have 
used rewards to provide an incentive for marginal donors to make 
 
151 Bradford, supra note 14, at 16. 
152 See An Introduction to Crowdfunding, NESTA (July 2012), http://www.em-a.eu 
/fileadmin/content/REALISE_IT_2/REALISE_IT_3/IntroToCrowdfunding.pdf. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See generally id. (describing the general types of rewards donors receive). 
157 Bradford, supra note 14, at 16. 
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small contributions. For example, contributors to the Sierra Club or 
National Public Radio may receive a reward, like a coffee mug or a 
tote bag, in exchange for contributing twenty-five or fifty dollars. 
Smaller charities are much less likely to offer rewards of this kind. 
The unlikelihood of smaller charities offering rewards is consistent 
with the hypothesis that using rewards to incentivize small 
contributions is efficient only if the marginal cost of charitable 
solicitation is low. Large charities and charities that operate a medium 
of mass communication have a low marginal cost of solicitation, so 
they can afford to offer a reward in exchange for a small contribution. 
By contrast, small charities have historically had a high marginal cost 
of solicitation, so they could not afford to offer rewards, and often 
were forced to hire professional solicitors.158 Crowdfunding levels the 
playing field, reducing the marginal cost of solicitation for small 
charities by providing access to a medium of mass communication 
and enabling the charities to cheaply and easily reach large numbers 
of potential donors. 
Kickstarter, which focuses on creative projects, is one of the most 
successful contemporary crowdfunding platforms using the reward 
model.159 Kickstarter requires users to specify their fundraising goal 
and the duration of their fundraising campaign.160 Contributors 
pledge to donate.161 If a Kickstarter project meets or exceeds its goal 
by the end of the campaign, the creator of the project receives all of 
the pledges.162 If it does not, the creator of the project receives 
nothing.163 If a Kickstarter project is funded, Kickstarter takes a 
commission of five percent of the total contributions to the project.164 
Kickstarter requires recipients to offer rewards in exchange for 
contributions, but does specify the nature of the rewards.165 While 
Kickstarter rewards can consist of almost anything, they are often the 
 
158 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 
605, 624 (2003) (holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit fraud claims against 
professional fundraisers hired by charities). 
159 Bradford, supra note 14, at 16; Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited May 30, 2014) 
[hereinafter Kickstarter Basics]. 




164 Dave Roos, How Kickstarter Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://money.howstuff 
works.com/kickstarter1.htm (last visited May 30, 2014). 
165 Kickstarter Basics, supra note 159. 
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product of the project for which they are a reward.166 A Kickstarter 
reward can also have any relationship to the size of the contribution 
for which it is a reward.167 
Kickstarter projects that are predominantly commercial tend to 
offer rewards that are close in value to the amount of the contribution. 
Of course, the donor will wait some time to receive the product, and 
there is no guarantee that it will ever be successfully produced. As a 
result, most Kickstarter projects effectively offer rewards worth less 
than the amount of the contribution.168 Kickstarter projects that are 
predominantly charitable tend to offer rewards that are much less 
valuable than the amount of the contribution. Kickstarter projects that 
propose to fund a community art project tend to offer recognition or 
some other token of appreciation. 
In general, successful Kickstarter projects are funded primarily by 
small contributions.169 For example, one recent project received 703 
contributions totaling $13,606, including 495 contributions of $10 or 
more, and about 83% of its contributions were $50 or less.170 This is 
typical of Kickstarter projects: 83% of funded projects offer backers a 
reward for a pledge of less than $20.171 In addition, projects that offer 
backers a reward for a pledge of less than $20 have a 54% success 
rate, but projects that do not only have a 35% success rate.172 
The reward model solves charity failures caused by the charitable 
contribution deduction because rewards can subsidize charitable 
contributions made by low-income taxpayers and thereby compensate 
for free riding on their charitable contributions. Under the charitable 
 
166 Creator Handbook: Rewards, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help 
/handbook/rewards (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). Kickstarter prohibits certain kinds of 
rewards. See Prohibited Items, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules 
/prohibited (last visited Aug. 8, 2014). For example, a Kickstarter project cannot offer a 
chance at a prize (illegal gambling) and cannot offer equity in a project (unregistered 
securities). See id. In addition, Kickstarter appears to disallow some projects and rewards 
on policy grounds. See id. 
167 See Creator Handbook: Rewards, supra note 166. 
168 See Bradford, supra note 14, at 17. 
169 See Dave Roos, Tips for Funding a Kickstarter Project, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://money.howstuffworks.com/kickstarter3.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). 
170 IronSpike, Poorcraft: A Comic Book Guide to Frugal Urban Suburban Living, 
KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/ironspike/poorcraft-a-comic-book      
-guide-to-frugal-urban-and?pos=1 (last visited Aug. 9, 2014); Yancey Strickler, The Price 
is Right, in Kickstarter Blog, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.kickstarter 
.com/blog/the-price-is-right [hereinafter The Price is Right]. 
171 The Price is Right, supra note 170. 
172 Id. 
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contribution deduction, donors receive a tax deduction.173 Under the 
reward model of crowdfunding, donors receive rewards instead. 
While low-income taxpayers receive little or no benefit from a tax 
deduction, they receive the full benefit of a reward. Moreover, donors 
who make small contributions receive only a small benefit from a tax 
deduction but may receive a significant benefit from a reward. 
Many charities offer rewards in exchange for contributions. For 
example, many public radio and television stations use a rewards 
model to incentivize donations.174 A donor who makes a small 
charitable contribution may receive a coffee cup or a tote bag. A 
donor who makes a large charitable contribution may receive a 
naming opportunity or board position. 
The fact that charities commonly provide rewards for donations 
suggests that they implicitly recognize that the charitable contribution 
deduction causes charity failures, some of which can be solved by 
rewards. However, the charitable contribution deduction discourages 
rewards because a donor who receives a quid pro quo cannot deduct a 
charitable contribution.175 Essentially, a charitable contribution is not 
deductible if the contributor receives something of more than nominal 
value in exchange for the contribution.176 
The remarkable success of the rewards model of crowdfunding 
suggests that rewards can subsidize donations from low-income 
donors that cannot be subsidized by the charitable contribution 
deduction. Most Kickstarter projects are not created by charities, so 
contributions cannot be deducted, and the average Kickstarter pledge 
is between twenty-five and fifty dollars.177 In other words, most 
Kickstarter donors are making relatively small, nondeductible 
contributions in exchange for rewards. 
The hypothesis that rewards can subsidize donations from low-
income donors is supported by the fact that the reward model of 
 
173 Charitable Contribution Deductions, supra note 69. 
174 See, e.g., Support Louisville Public Media, LOUISVILLE PUBLIC MEDIA, 
https://louisvillepublicmedia.webconnex.com/contribute (last visited Aug. 9. 2014) 
(allowing a donor to choose to receive a cookbook, a DVD, a CD, or no reward in 
exchange for a contribution of $180 to Louisville Public Media). 
175 See Charitable Contributions–Quid Pro Quo Contributions, IRS, http://www.irs 
.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Charitable-Contributions-Quid      
-Pro-Quo-Contributions (last updated Mar. 5, 2014). 
176 See The Marketing of Philanthropy, supra note 41, at 662–63. 
177 Fred Benenson & Yancey Strickler, Trends in Pricing and Duration, in Kickstarter 
Blog, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Sept. 21, 2010), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/trends-in    
-pricing-and-duration. 
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crowdfunding has proven particularly effective for creative projects. 
Studies show that most low-income taxpayers do not contribute to arts 
organizations.178 While the charitable contribution deduction can 
incentivize marginal, high-income donors to make charitable 
contributions to arts organizations, crowdfunding appears to provide 
the incentive necessary for low-income taxpayers to contribute to arts 
organizations. 
Because crowdfunded projects can offer a wide range of rewards in 
exchange for a wide range of contributions, crowdfunding enables 
projects to better tailor rewards to the preferences of their donors. 
This makes crowdfunding more efficient than traditional forms of 
fundraising and enables crowdfunded projects to generate more 
contributions than direct solicitation. 
Indeed, the use of crowdfunding for creative projects illuminates 
this hypothesis. For quite some time, donors have made charitable 
contributions to creative projects using “fiscal sponsors.”179 A 
donation is deductible only if it is a charitable contribution.180 
Accordingly, a donation to a creative project is deductible only if the 
creative project is the project of a charity. A donation to an individual 
is not deductible; in order to deduct donations to individuals, donors 
contribute to a charity that acts as a “fiscal sponsor” to the 
individual.181 The donor then suggests that the charity use the 
donation to fund the individual’s creative project.182 The charity 
receives an administrative fee up to ten percent for this service.183 
The result is that the donor gets a deduction, the charity gets a fee, 
and the individual gets the money. Fiscal sponsorship appeals to high-
income donors because it allows them to utilize the charitable 
contribution deduction. It also appeals to charitable foundations that 
have restrictions on making distributions to individuals. 
The reward model of crowdfunding operates in much the same way 
as fiscal sponsorship, with the exception that the donor receives a 
reward rather than a deduction. Essentially, fiscal sponsorship appeals 
 
178 See ODENDAHL, supra note 37, at 3. 
179 See George Johnson & David Jones, K. Community Foundations, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick94.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). Forms of fiscal 
sponsorship date back to the 1940s. See id. 
180 Fiscal Sponsors, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, http://www.councilofnonprofits 
.org/fiscal-sponsorship (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). 
181 Id.; see Johnson & Jones, supra note 179. 
182 See Johnson & Jones, supra at 179. 
183 Id. 
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to high-income taxpayers for whom the charitable contribution 
deduction is valuable, and the reward model of crowdfunding appeals 
to low-income taxpayers for whom rewards are valuable. Indeed, 
many crowdfunded projects allow donors to decide whether they wish 
to donate through the crowdfunding platform and take a reward or 
donate through a fiscal sponsor and take a deduction. For example, I 
co-created two Kickstarter projects relating to the film Our Nixon 
(2013), which I co-produced.184 Both projects informed contributors 
that they could contribute to our fiscal sponsor if they wanted to take 
a deduction for their contribution. We found that some donors who 
contributed one thousand dollars or more chose to use our fiscal 
sponsor rather than Kickstarter. 
c. The Lending and Equity Models 
Under the lending model, recipients offer to repay contributions 
over time, often with interest.185 Thus, under this model, contributors 
expect a return on their investment.186 Under the equity model, 
recipients offer a share of their profits.187 The loan and equity models 
are used primarily by crowdfunding platforms that focus on 
commercial projects.188 These models differ from the other types 
because they ask contributors to invest in a project rather than make a 
donation or purchase.189 
2. The Legality of the Lending and Equity Models 
Initially, the viability of the lending and equity models was 
dubious, as they appeared to violate federal securities laws.190 In fact, 
crowdfunding platform PROfounders tried to implement the equity 
model but folded in early 2012, citing “the current regulatory 
environment.”191 
 
184 Brian L. Frye & Penny Lane, Our Nixon, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter 
.com/projects/1222291754/our-nixon-found-footage-documentary (last visited Aug. 9, 
2014); Brian L. Frye & Penny Lane, Our Nixon–Premiere at SXSW & Beyond!, 
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1222291754/our-nixon-premiere-at   
-sxsw-and-beyond (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). 
185 Bradford, supra note 14, at 20. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 24. 
188 Id. at 21. 
189 Id. at 20. 
190 Id. at 29. 
191 Joyce M. Rosenberg, New Crowdfunding Law Helps Small Businesses Find 
Investors, HUFFINGTON POST: NEWS AND TRENDS (Apr. 12, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://www 
FRYE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2014  1:24 PM 
2014] Solving Charity Failures 189 
But on April 12, 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, or JOBS Act, which eased 
various securities regulations in order to make it easier for small 
businesses to raise capital.192 Among other provisions, the JOBS Act 
includes the CROWDFUND Act, creating an exemption intended to 
permit the equity model of crowdfunding.193 This exemption allows 
companies to fundraise up to one million dollars from unaccredited 
investors without registering with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, provided that the funds are raised through a registered 
broker or crowdfunding platform.194 The exemption also limits the 
amount of money that can be raised from an unaccredited investor 
based on that investor’s income.195 However, businesses cannot 
currently take advantage of this exemption because the SEC has not 
completed the rulemaking process.196 
3. Solving Charity Failures with the Lending and Equity Models 
The lending model and the equity model of crowdfunding could 
solve some charity failures. In particular, they could provide access to 
capital for individuals and businesses engaged in charitable activities. 
However, they cannot solve most charity failures because they 
anticipate a return on investment. 
Producing charitable goods is generally not a profitable enterprise. 
If it were, there would be no need for charity. Indeed, classical 
economics predicts market failures in charitable goods precisely 
because they are not profitable to produce.197 
The donation and reward models of crowdfunding help solve 
charity failures by making charitable giving easier and providing 
targeted incentives to marginal, low-income donors. The donation 
model provides no subsidy, and the reward model provides a subsidy 
that costs less than the contribution. As a consequence, the donation 
 
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/12/new-crowdfunding-law-help_n_1420708.html (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
192 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-05, 126 Stat. 
306, 315 (codified in 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
193 Id. The Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-
Disclosure Act (CROWDFUND Act) is one component of the broader JOBS Act. See id. 
194 See id. 
195 Crowdfunding, 33 Fed. Reg. 9470 (2013), 34 Fed Reg. 70741 (2013) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts 200, 277, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
196 See id. 
197 See supra notes 42–48, 55 and accompanying text. 
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and reward models are useful to individuals and organizations 
producing unprofitable charitable goods. 
By contrast, the lending and equity models of crowdfunding 
anticipate a return on investment. As a consequence, they are of 
limited utility to individuals and organizations that produce 
unprofitable charitable goods because lenders and investors are 
unlikely to lend to or invest in charitable activities with a projected 
negative return. As a consequence, the lending and equity models of 
crowdfunding are unlikely to solve most charity failures. 
IV 
CROWDFUNDING SOLVES SOME CHARITY FAILURES 
While all of the forms of crowdfunding may help solve charity 
failures, the reward model of crowdfunding appears to solve charity 
failures most effectively. Unlike the other models of crowdfunding, 
the reward model compensates for free riding on charitable 
contributions, and it does so without requiring that charitable 
activities generate a profit. Most importantly, the reward model of 
crowdfunding can provide an incentive for low-income donors to 
make a contribution by offering a targeted reward rather than a 
deduction. 
The donation model of crowdfunding may solve some charity 
failures by making charitable giving easier and more efficient. 
Crowdfunding platforms are generally streamlined and intuitive; they 
make it easy for charities to create projects and for donors to make 
contributions. In addition, they enable charities to reach more people 
more easily, and crowdfunding platforms enable donors to review a 
broader range of charities. Perhaps more importantly, crowdfunding 
platforms encourage charities to think about how to pitch projects 
effectively and to identify charitable goods that are demanded. 
However, the only incentive that the donation model can provide is a 
deduction for charitable recipients. Thus, the donation model cannot 
solve the charity failures caused by the deduction. 
The reward model of crowdfunding retains all of the advantages of 
the donation model. However, it also solves some of the charity 
failures caused by the deduction. The deduction causes charity 
failures because it cannot compensate for free riding on charitable 
contributions made by low-income taxpayers. But the reward model 
of crowdfunding can compensate for free riding on those 
contributions by providing a reward rather than a deduction. While 
low-income taxpayers usually cannot take a deduction, they can 
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receive a reward. In other words, low-income taxpayers receive no 
value from the subsidy provided by the deduction, but they receive 
the full value of a reward from a crowdfunded project. 
The reward model of crowdfunding can compensate for free riding 
more efficiently than the deduction because the value of the reward is 
adjustable in relation to the project, but the value of the subsidy 
provided by the deduction is not. The subsidy the deduction provides 
does not depend on the recipient of the charitable contributions, so 
some projects will receive a subsidy that is too large, and some will 
receive a subsidy that is too small. But crowdfunded projects can 
offer many different rewards calibrated to the incentive necessary for 
a particular project. Projects that are predominantly charitable may 
offer rewards with little value, as little additional incentive beyond 
altruism is necessary to induce contributions. But projects that are 
predominantly commercial may offer high value rewards as altruism 
will not motivate sufficient contributions. 
While the lending and equity models of crowdfunding may also 
help solve charity failures by enabling charities to raise capital more 
efficiently, they cannot directly address the charity failures caused by 
the deduction. It will be interesting to see how they are used once the 
IRS completes the rulemaking process. 
Essentially, crowdfunding appears to be successful, at least in part, 
because it provides a technological solution to certain charity failures 
caused by the deduction. Of course, crowdfunding cannot solve all 
charity failures caused by the deduction. Many low-income taxpayers 
lack convenient access to computers or the Internet, and they may not 
be familiar with crowdfunding platforms.198 Others may find 
crowdfunding an unappealing way of making charitable contributions. 
And the reward model of crowdfunding appears to work more 
effectively for some kinds of charitable projects than others. In 
particular, it seems to work well for creative projects but less well for 
social justice projects.199 This suggests that it may be necessary to 
develop alternative ways of solving charity failures in charitable 
goods that are not suited to crowdfunding. 
 
198 Edward Wyatt, Most of U.S. Is Wired, but Millions Aren’t Plugged in, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/technology/a-push-to-connect          
-millions-who-live-offline-to-the-internet.html. 
199 For example, Kickstarter is many orders of magnitude more successful than 
Hatchfund. See Kickstarter Basics, supra note 159; How We Work, HATCHFUND, 
http://www.hatchfund.org/get_involved/artists (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). 
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CONCLUSION 
The charitable contribution deduction solves market failures and 
government failures in charitable goods by subsidizing charitable 
contributions. But the charitable contribution deduction causes charity 
failures because it cannot subsidize the charitable contributions made 
by low-income taxpayers. Crowdfunding provides a technological 
solution to some of those charity failures by offering rewards rather 
than subsidies. 
 
